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THE LEGAL INCUBATION OF ARTIFICIAL
INSEMINATION: A PROPOSAL TO
AMEND THE ILLINOIS
PARENTAGE ACT
The number of adoptable infants has steadily declined in recent
years. Consequently, many married couples have accepted artificial
insemination as an alternative means of conceiving a child. Heterologous insemination is a procedure in which a married woman is
inseminated with the semen of a third party donor. This procedure
is commonly referred to as the Artificial Insemination Donor (AID)
method. The recently enacted Illinois Parentage Act (IPA),' however, fails to adequately define the relationship of a child born to a
married couple through heterologous artificial insemination and,
therefore, several provisions of the IPA need to be amended.
In enacting the IPA, the legislature essentially adopted the language of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) 2 which expressed three
vital functions. First, it legitimized a child conceived through the
AID procedure as long as the husband of the impregnated woman
consented to the procedure. Second, it relieved the third party donor of any parental responsibilities. Finally, it permitted the disclosure of confidential records pertaining to the insemination when
"good cause" is shown.
Although the IPA effectively addresses certain valid concerns
deriving from the AID procedure, the scope of the IPA is unquestionably limited. The Commissioner's comments to section 5 of the
UPA noted the Act's inadequacy in dealing with many of the pressing legal issues raised by artificial insemination.3 The Commissioner urged state legislators to further consider certain legal
aspects of this process before drafting legislation. Unfortunately,
these comments, were not heeded when the Illinois legislature
passed the IPA because the IPA is virtually a mirror image of the
fallible UPA.
The IPA is presently in need of reform. It should be amended
to resolve three significant issues pertaining to the administration
of the AID procedure. First, the IPA fails to clarify whether the
insemination of a married woman constitutes adultery. In 1954, in
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 1451-53 (1984).
2. UNIFORM PARENTAGE AcT § 5 (1973).
3. UNIFORM PARENTAGE AT § 5 (1973) (Commissioner's comment). The
Commissioner noted that "this Act does not deal with many complex and legal
problems raised by the practice of artificial insemination." Id.
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Doornbosv. Doornbos,4 an Illinois appellate court held that the AID
method constituted adultery, on the part of the mother, regardless
of whether the insemination was performed with the consent of the
husband. The current trend in other states, however, is to recognize the AID procedure as outside the realm of adultery because
there is no sexual intercourse between the donor and the mother. 5
In light of Doornbos, Illinois arguably remains in opposition to
the persuasive stand adopted by other jurisdictions. To overcome
this undesirable position, the IPA should be amended to expressly
state that the impregnation of a married woman by artificial insemination does not constitute adultery. This amendment would permit the married couple to utilize the AID method without any
apprehension of potential criminal repercussions.
A second legal ramification of the AID procedure which the
IPA does not address adequately relates to the question of legitimacy. The IPA legitimizes the AID child of a married couple so
long as the husband consents, in writing, to the procedure. This
language is important because if the AID child is deemed the legitimate offspring of the married couple, it must follow that the child
should be regarded as the biological child of the consenting husband. This proposition poses several questions concerning the
rights and obligations of a husband who consents to the AID
procedure.
In Anonymous v. Anonymous,6 for example, a New York court

held that a husband who had signed a written agreement consenting to the AID procedure had a legal duty to support a child
conceived through artificial insemination. In In re Adoption of
Anonymous,7 the consenting husband of an artificially impregnated
woman was considered the "parent" of the AID child, and thus his
approval was required in subsequent adoption proceedings. These
cases illustrate the potential problems that the AID process generates when the husband consents to the AID procedure.
The glaring weakness of the IPA legitimacy provision, however, is that the statutory language fails to define the rights and
obligations of the parties when the husband does not consent to the
AID procedure. The legal status of the AID child, absent such consent, is highly speculative. Likewise, the rights and duties of the
non-consenting husband remain unclear. One view is to declare the
4. Doornbos v. Doornbos, Super. Ct. Cook County, No. 545 14981, 23
U.S.L.W. 2308 (1954), affd, 12 Ill. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956) (abstract).
5. See, e.g., People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7
(1968).
6. 41 Misc. 2d 886, 246 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1964).
7. 74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1973).
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AID child illegitimate without such consent.8 The underlying rationale of this position is that the child was born against the will of
the husband, and therefore the law should not force the husband to
support the child.
Some commentators, however, have espoused an alternative
theory which avoids the stigma of labeling an AID child as illegitimate. 9 If an AID child is conceived without the husband's consent,
but nevertheless is subsequently supported by the husband, then
the child should be regarded as the legitimate and natural child of
the married couple. Thus, if the couple is later divorced, the husband would be estopped from avoiding child support payments. An
amendment to the IPA to preclude the non-consenting husband
from denying his parental duties, once he manifests an initial willingness to provide for the child, would operate to guard the vulnerable rights of the AID child.
A third area in which the IPA is deficient concerns the underlying mechanics of the AID procedure. The IPA does not effectively regulate the practice of physicians who perform artificial
insemination. A survey conducted by the New England Journal of
Medicine concluded that physicians conducted negligible genetic
screenings of donors.' 0 Less than 29% of the 700 physicians surveyed stated that they actually performed biochemical tests on the
donor, and only one percent tested for the carrier state of Tay Sachs
disease. Furthermore, the study found that the majority of physicians performing artificial insemination procedures were inadequately trained.
New York is one state which regulates sperm donation adequately. For instance, in New York City, the New York Municipal
Code requires that AID donors undergo serological blood tests, and
the state disqualifies the donor if a disease or genetic defect is detected.'1 The Code also penalizes physicians who ignore these pro8. See Smith, Through a Test-Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and
the Law, 67 MICH. L. REV. 127, 145 (1968).
9. See, e.g., Comment, Artificial Human Reproduction: Legal Problems
Presented by the Test Tube Baby, 28 EMORY L.J. 1045, 1076 (1979); Comment,
Artificial Insemination and Surrogate Motherhood-A Nursery Full of Unanswered Questions, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 913, 939 (1981). The author proposes
a solution that would create "a rebuttable presumption of paternity in favor of
the mother's husband.. ." Id. at 939. The husband could bring forth evidence
"establishing that the procedure was unrequested and that the child is unwanted." Id. However, the child would still be afforded some protection. If the
husband fails to rebut the presumption, then the child, "conceived without initial consent, but later accepted and wanted by the unconsenting husband, would

not face the risk of legal bastardization." Id.
10. See Currie-Cohen, Lutrell & Shapiro, Current Practiceof Artificial Insemination by Donor in the United States, 300 NEw ENG. J. MED. 585, 588

(1979).
11. N.Y.C. DEPT. OF HEALTH, HEALTH CODE

§§ 21.01 - 21.05 (1973).
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cedures. The Illinois legislature has failed to regulate this area
effectively, an oversight that ultimately perils the health of the unprotected AID child. The IPA should incorporate a provision, similar to the New York Code, demanding that physicians conduct a
thorough examination of the AID donor prior to his donation. Only
then will the integrity of the AID procedure be preserved.
Closely related to the matter of insufficient examination of donors by physicians is the problem of incomplete medical records,
and the failure of most physicians to retain permanent files of AID
donors and the children conceived through the AID procedure. The
New England Survey determined that there was inadequate record
keeping by physicians because of physicians' concerns in protecting
the confidentiality of the donor's identity.
Once again, New York stringently demands the maintenance of
permanent records of the AID donor. 12 The data must reveal the
test results for gonorrhea, tuberculosis, blood tests, and any other
congenital disease or defect. These confidential records must also
include the names and addresses of the physician, donor, and recipient. The only occasion in which these medical records may be reviewed is upon a showing of "good cause.' 3 These regulations are
beneficial because they legitimately balance the competing interests
of the donor's confidentiality and the disclosure of vital medical
records.
The IPA refers to "records" in section 3 of the Act, 14 but it does
not mandate that complete files be maintained. Without this necessary stringent regulation, most physicians will not retain comprehensive medical records. Because the IPA does not require
physicians to keep permanent records of the AID donor or child, it
fails to effectively provide for the potential needs of the AID child
who may subsequently establish valid medical reasons for obtaining
the identity of the AID donor. An amended provision to the IPA
directing physicians to preserve complete records of AID donors
and their recipients would be a valuable and essential addition to
the IPA.
A recent report indicates that over 20,000 infants are born annually as a result of the artificial insemination method of conception. Yet, the IPA does not address several complex legal issues
that are incubating because of this procedure. The Illinois legislature should clarify the legal ramifications of the AID procedure for
married couples by incorporating the following amendments into
the IPA. First, the IPA should declare that the conception of a
married woman through the AID method does not constitute adul12. N.Y.C. DEPT. OF HEALTH, HEALTH CODE, § 21.07(a) (1973).
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1453(a) (1984).
14. Id.
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tery. Second, the Act should include a provision which estops a
non-consenting husband from denying future parental responsibility once he has manifested a willingness to support the AID child.
Finally, the IPA must be amended so that it strictly regulates the
physical examination of artificial insemination donors and requires
physicians to retain comprehensive medical records of the donor
and the AID child. These proposed amendments to the IPA are
critical because they would protect not only the participating married couple and the third party donor, but more importantly, they
would preserve the legal rights of the AID child.
Michael Condon

